https://ir.dila.edu.tw//handle/123456789/199
DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
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dc.contributor.author | 蔡錚雲 | en_US |
dc.creator | 蔡錚雲 | - |
dc.creator | Cheng-yun Tsai | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-01T08:20:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-04-01T08:20:02Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2004-07 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://172.27.2.131/handle/123456789/199 | - |
dc.description.abstract | 自笛卡兒的「心物二元」論以來,身心問題一直是西方哲學討論的主要課題之一。可是,嚴格地說,這是個虛假的問題。本文將採系譜建構之論述模式對它進行哲學思維的揭露,而非系統理論的遮蔽。 此一系譜建構是以被遺忘的身體為主。檢視西田幾多郎如何用「場所邏輯」來解釋「絕對無」的無中生有。湯淺泰雄如何異於一般宗教哲學的角度,發揚西田「場所邏輯」所仰賴的行動直觀。由於湯淺運用的是現象學,隱藏在「純粹經驗」中的身體才能自行揭露出來。這種建構的方式,最後交由梅洛龐蒂透過馬里布郎士、畢翰與伯格森對身體系譜建構來展現。馬里布郎士率先發現未反省主體的內在感覺,畢翰用身體經驗的活動去描繪心物二元的原初事實,開創了處理實質內容的現象學雛形,伯格森從我們與事物的原始統一性建立起知識,證實了西田的「終極實在」。不過,湯淺把行動直觀解釋為身體的做法,是在梅洛龐蒂對伯格森批判中才告成立。那就是說,現象學方法的操作,是依種讓感覺與理性並行不悖的感覺邏輯;因為它不是在說明一個道理,而是在身體力行中,讓道理自行去訴說。 | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Mind-body is one of the main issues in Western philosophy ever since R. Descartes separates mind from the body. But, seriously speaking, it is a false issue. We are going to take the genealogical constitution as a narrative in this paper to reveal its philosophical thinking instead of the concealment of theoretical system. Such a genealogical constitution is based on the realm of the forgotten body. We first examine how Nishida Kitar□ employed ‘logic of field’ to explain the creation of ‘Absolute nothingness’, and how Yuasa Yasuo, in distinction from normal view of philosophy of religion, to exemplify action intuition that Nishida’s ‘logic of field’ relied upon. It is due to this employment of phenomenology by Yuasa, body, which is hidden in ‘pure experience’, presents itself to us. Finally, this procedure of deconstruction is carried out by Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the genealogical constitution of body from Malebrance, Biran and Bergson. Malebrance first discovered the inner sense of unreflective subject. And then, Biran described the primitive fact of mind-body with the activity of body-experience to open the channel original unity of things and us so as to allow Nishida’s ‘ultimate reality’ to be confirmed. Nonetheless, Yuasa’s interpretation of body as action intuition is actually justified by Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Bergson. That is to say, phenomenological operation is concerned with the logic of sense, which does not exclude either sensation or reason. For it is not saying something, but let the things be said by body’s pratice. | - |
dc.language.iso | zh | en_US |
dc.publisher | 法鼓人文社會學院 | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | 法鼓人文學報 | en_US |
dc.subject | 身心問題 | en_US |
dc.subject | 系譜建構 | en_US |
dc.subject | 西田幾多郎 | en_US |
dc.subject | 湯淺泰雄 | en_US |
dc.subject | 梅洛龐蒂 | en_US |
dc.subject | Mind-body | en_US |
dc.subject | Genealogical construction | en_US |
dc.subject | Nishida KitarõYuada Yasuo | en_US |
dc.subject | M. Merleau-Ponty | en_US |
dc.title | 身心問題的另類思考--西田幾多郎、湯淺泰雄到梅洛龐蒂的身體觀系譜 | en_US |
dc.title | The Other Way of Mind-Body: The Genealogy of the View of Body from Nishida Kitarõ, Yuada Yasuo to M. Merleau-Ponty | - |
dc.type | journal article | en_US |
dc.relation.journalissue | 1 | en_US |
dc.relation.pages | 153-177 | en_US |
item.fulltext | with fulltext | - |
item.grantfulltext | open | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | other | - |
顯示於: | 學術出版組 |
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08.身心問題的另類思考西.pdf | 全文 | 11.05 MB | Adobe PDF | 檢視/開啟 |
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