劉蕺山論「喜怒哀樂」--兼論其在身心修養之意義

Abstract

明末理學家劉蕺山（宗周，1578～1645）有關「情」的論述，獨樹一幟，其原創性見解展現在他對《中庸》「喜怒哀樂」所作的創造性詮釋上。本文試圖由蕺山對朱子性情論的批判切入，繼而揭示蕺山對《中庸》「喜怒哀樂」的理解、詮釋，及其意義結構。最後，則由蕺山強調《中庸》「喜怒哀樂」與「七情」的區分，思考其在身心修養上的實踐意義。 本文指出，蕺山透過字義訓詁與義理論證，拆解朱熹「性情」二分的主流看法，強調「情」作「情實」解的古義。並以「即性言情」的進路，界定「喜怒哀樂」為「性之情」；進而「指情言性」，以「喜怒哀樂」之周流不息（貞下起元、哀樂相生），來具體化天道性體心體之義蘊。如是，「喜怒哀樂」乃脫離一般作為感性之情的日常語言之含意，成為一本體宇宙論之哲學概念。它既是創生萬物的「四氣」，也是道德創造的「四德」。在這個意義下，「喜怒哀樂」與「七情」有嚴格的區分。前者是人性的眞實呈現，後者是人心異化後的不當欲望。因而，就道德修養而言，培養「喜怒哀樂」之「性情」，才是身心轉化的根本工夫。

As a Neo-Confucian in the late Ming, Liu Jishan (Zhongzhou, 1578-1645) offered a philosophical discourse on qing. His insight is expressed in his creative interpretation of the context “pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy” in the Zhongyong. He took the feelings of “pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy” as “Siqi” (four kinds of qi), and he also called them “Side” (four virtues.) Both of these terms pertain to the transcendent level and become onto-cosmological concepts, differing from the so-called “qiqing” (seven emotions: joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, desire) in general understanding. First, this paper analyzes Liu how criticizes Zhuxi’s dualistic theory of xing-qing. In this way, Liu emphasized that in its ancient meaning qin was real essence, and so he defined the feelings of “pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy” as the real human nature. Then, I explore how Liu reveals the onto-cosmological contents of “Siqi” and “Side”. In the context of the Way of Heaven, “Siqi” is an active force that is always transforming and completing things. In the context of human nature, “Side” is an original moral agent in the mind. Finally, by showing how Liu makes a clear distinction between “Side” (four virtues) and “qiqing” (seven emotions,) I point out that the former is the reality of human nature and the latter are not authentic desires. In this sense, the moral effort of body-mind cultivation is directed towards the feelings of “pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy.”